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Managing Paradoxes in Public Partnerships 
To say that the trends to develop collaboration to deliver public services derive from global 
macrotrends inspired by the principles of New Public Management is a commonplace. This 
paper applies the lenses of institutional theory to the study of voluntary inter-municipal 
partnerships and counter-argues that collaboration initiatives are shaped by the interaction of 
political, functional and social pressures. Interestingly, this process of continuous shaping 
concerns both the creation and the disruption of collaborative arrangements. The capacity of  
Oliver’s (1992) concept of deinstitutionalisation of complement operational explanations is 
exemplified by illustrating the experience of voluntary inter-municipal collaborations in the 
Italian region of Lombardy. As part of an ongoing research programme, the paper draws 
primarily on relevant organisation research and previous qualitative fieldwork carried out by 
the authors. 
Keywords: Local government, incentive policies, implementation, inter-municipal 
collaboration, partnerships, paradoxes, deinstitutionalisation 
Introduction 
Developing collaboration to deliver services and to address complex problems more efficiently and 
effectively than through autonomous action is considered a key driver of public action throughout 
Western countries. Collaborative arrangements (common labels used to define these conglomerates 
of connections include networks, joined-up government, inter-municipal arrangements, and 
partnerships) aim to jointly implement policies at local level and provide services through an 
alternative model to that of traditional direct service delivery.  
Up to now, the prevailing view of the broad literature, at both the academic and the 
professional level, is that collaboration is a global convergent trend, ‘a means of improving 
municipal management systems’ (Dollery, Garcea, & LeSage, 2008a, pp. 194-195). Much of the 
research assumes that collaboration in and of itself must be desirable (McGuire, 2006). 
Collaborations are closely associated with the ideas and practices of ‘managerialism’ or ‘new public 
management’ (hereafter NPM) reform agenda (Barretta & Busco, 2011; Dollery, Garcea, & LeSage, 
2008b). The ‘joined-up government’ movement in the UK (late 1990s), the ‘whole of government’ 
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approach in Australia (after 2000) and the ‘franchise government’ movement in the US (1990s) 
(Bovaird & Tizard, 2009, p. 235) are the most well-known international examples of initiatives 
aimed at reinventing local government. A recent report (Testa, 2010) attests to the growth in 
popularity of inter-municipal partnerships in Italy too (see also: Borgonovi, 2000a; Borgonovi, 
2000b; Meneguzzo & Cepiku, 2008; Rebora & Meneguzzo, 1992), where NPM principles were 
adopted relatively late. The dominant discourse is generally related to an uncritical and optimistic 
view of collaborative management, seen as a way to achieve competitive advantage. 
Nevertheless, a growing body of research, while recognising extensive commonalities of the 
reform paths between one country and another, underscores the large variety of structural features, 
scope and patterns of collaborations across and within countries. Unlike the mainstream discourse 
that addresses mainly the rational motives that induce collaboration, this second research stream 
attributes a determining weight to the factors that shape collaboration choices, including national 
institutional contexts, environmental factors and local preferences, and, more importantly, are 
interested in exploring the development of the collaborative arrangements over time.  
This paper slots into the latter research stream and focuses on a research field with its own 
specific traits, the horizontal collaborations set up between municipalities: ‘While vertical inter-
organisational activity tends to combine complementary capabilities, resources or processes across 
organisations, horizontal exchange of activity between organisations frequently combines 
potentially competitive or substitutable capabilities, resources or processes. This can result in 
complex inter-organisational interdependencies and tensions between constituent and collaborative 
goals that are quite distinct from those observed in vertical contexts’ (Grafton, Abernethy, & Lillis, 
2011, p. 243). A clearer understanding of the collaboration practices in these settings is therefore 
essential to direct research and practice (Barringer & Harrison, 2000, p. 396).  
As a contribution to the ongoing public management debate, the paper seeks to broaden the 
understanding of inter-municipal collaborations by highlighting some of the paradoxes (i.e., 
apparent contradictions) and unintended consequences (i.e., opposite effects to those desired by 
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their architects) of these initiatives. For example: Why do local administrations prefer the 
contracting-out of public services to external suppliers or the signing of agreements with 
neighbouring municipalities as opposed to a form of permanent institutionalised (and subsidised) 
collaboration? What is the cause of the stagnation that characterises most of the established 
collaborations?  
The paper adopts the logic used by Pollitt (2001) in his criticism of the deterministic idea of 
international convergence towards the NPM styles, and sets Pollitt’s original analysis, inspired by 
institutionalist theory, alongside Oliver’s (1992) concept of ‘deinstitutionalisation’. Drawing on 
research carried out in the Italian region of Lombardy, this latter concept will be used to frame the 
empirical evidence of voluntary inter-municipal collaborations. What this article argues is that 
managing and developing joint work is – using the words of Barringer and Harrison (2000, p. 369) - 
a “fragile balance of competing forces” even in the ‘ideal’ situation in which the decision to 
collaborate is voluntary and supported by a constant flow of public funds. In an area of public 
action that is poorly structured, such as that defined by the policies that intend to spur stable forms 
of collaboration, paradoxically, the same policies can contribute to the ‘dissipation or rejection’ 
(Oliver, 1992, p. 566) of publicly-funded initiatives. 
Before proceeding, a few points need clarification. Here, the terms ‘collaboration’ and 
‘cooperation’ are used interchangeably to signify an action aimed at achieving a common goal. In 
the public sector, there is a wide variety of structural features, scope and patterns of arrangements, 
but the article focuses primarily on a specific form of collaborative ventures, i.e., the Unioni di 
comuni (Unions of municipalities, or UM), the associative forms set up between municipalities as 
separate entities to deliver services and joint policymaking. 
The paper begins by recalling the basic assumptions and limitations of the dominant concept 
of collaboration. Next, the emergence and growth of public collaborations will be associated with 
institutional isomorphism, a theory that – unlike the dominant discourse centred on economic 
efficiency – underscores the role played by the context in the creation and implementation of 
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collaboration arrangements. The paper then correlates the mixed picture of the voluntary inter-
municipal partnerships in the Lombardy region to the practices of deinstitutionalisation that the 
local actors develop in response to the political, functional and social pressures exerted in the 
respective local areas. Finally, the paper discusses the implications of a legitimacy-based view of 
public collaborations, and indicates future avenues of research. 
The mainstream view of collaboration 
The popularity of network arrangements has grown considerably over the years. Less than 20 years 
ago, the public network arrangements of the British National Health Service (NHS) were considered 
a far from consolidated area of academic investigation, and were even defined as ‘emerging’ (Ferlie 
& Pettigrew, 1996, p. S82). A recent article published in Organization Studies (Bort & Kieser, 
2011) that reviewed 1,784 research articles published in top organisation journals from 1960 until 
2005 has shown that the popularity of the network theory now exceeds that of the widely known 
approaches, including, but not limited to, Resource Based View, New Institutional Economics, and 
Institutionalism. 
The public management literature on public partnerships provides two main but opposing 
views. The dominant discourse assumes that the adoption of collaborative forms between public 
administrations is intrinsically “a good thing”, “a virtue” (Hudson, Hardy, Henwood, & Wistow, 
1999). ‘Joint provision of public services is a way to overcome production-related obstacles and 
simultaneously meet the rising expectations of citizens. Economies of scale (resulting from a higher 
production) and economies of scope (a consequence of a more varied production) can be realised. 
Further, joint planning and joint policy implementation make it possible to incorporate mutual 
interdependencies among neighbouring municipalities and thus enhance the quality and efficacy of 
local policies’ (Hulst & van Montfort, 2007, p. 211). In the literature, ‘there has been less emphasis 
on the costs than on the benefits of collaborative efforts’ (Agranoff, 2006, p. 66). Turrini et al. 
(2010, p. 210) say that: ‘The prevailing view among many service professionals, policymakers, and 
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researchers is that, by integrating services through a network of providing agencies, clients will gain 
the benefits of reduced fragmentation and greater coordination of services leading to a more 
effective system and, thus, more positive outcomes’. 
In contrast, other observers (the minority) criticise the presumed superiority of (and 
necessity for) collaborative arrangements versus hierarchical- and market-based types of public 
services production and delivery. A number of empirical studies (Huxham, 1993; Milward & 
Provan, 2003; Provan & Sebastian, 1998) point to the shadow areas, the contradictions and the 
implicit danger of certain over-optimistic readings. For example, the output from collaborative 
arrangements often appears to be negligible or the rate of output extremely slow. Even where 
successful outcomes are reported, stories of pain and hard grind are integral to the success achieved 
(Huxham, 1993). Indeed, Entwistle et al. (2007) found that public partnerships suffered 
predominately from a mix of hierarchical and market dysfunctions (p. 64). Despite its promise, the 
critics argue, ‘collaboration … is not a panacea’ (May & Winter, 2007, p. 499). 
But why does it make little sense to consider collaboration as a generalised and unavoidable 
trend for the public sector? Before responding to this question, two aspects need to be clarified. 
First, there are many proposals on how to define and conceptualise collaboration. “Collaboration” 
(or cooperation) is one of the most used terms in inter-organisational research (Ferro & Sorrentino, 
2010) and refers to an action of two or more subjects implemented to achieve a common goal. What 
makes an action cooperative is its end (Maggi, 2011, p. 80, original emphasis). The problem is that 
sometimes the term collaboration is used as a synonym of coordination. A choice that is hard to 
share because the notion of coordination refers instead to a concerted action aimed at managing 
interdependent elements (Thompson, 1967, pp. 54-55). In other words, cooperation is an expression 
of the action of one or more subjects, while coordination concerns the order of the process, meaning 
its regulation. 
Second, the mainstream discourse considers the collaborative forms a contrast to traditional 
hierarchical forms: the first being strongly associated with decentralisation and the latter considered 
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the maximum expression of centralisation. Also in this case, a terminological clarification is 
required. The centralisation-decentralisation dimension refers to the distribution of decisional 
capacity: for example, the decisional capacity of a centralised organisational form is concentrated in 
the hands of a few decision makers; similarly, a distributed decisional capacity characterises a 
decentralised form. On the other hand, cooperation (or collaboration), as discussed above, refers to 
a method of carrying out the action: cooperation exists when the actors share the objectives and not 
necessarily the methods. So it is incorrect to place the cooperative nature of the collaborative 
arrangements in opposition to the centralised or decentralised nature of the decision-making 
processes. As a result, it is arguable that collaboration between local administrations can be 
considered a method that broadens the decisional space of the peripheral levels of government. In 
short, for reasons of conceptual clarity, the question of cooperation must be kept separate from the 
question of the distribution of decisional scope (Masino, 2005, p. 172).  
To return to the main question, we need to first observe that no metric exists with which to 
measure the presumed ‘global’ convergence of the public organisations toward collaboration. 
According to Pollitt (2001, p. 493), the highest form of convergence is obtained when talks, 
decisions, action and results line up. To our knowledge, no comparative study of public partnerships 
has documented uniform and convergent results throughout countries to date.  
Second, the mainstream thinking seems incapable of grasping the variable range of 
situations in which collaboration takes place. Collaboration strategies follow trajectories that can 
vary considerably over time, in terms of the scope of cooperation among partners, their composition 
and the degree of organisational integration (Hulst, van Montfort, Haveri, Airaksinen, & Kelly, 
2009). Comparative research suggests that collaboration arrangements are influenced by a number 
of institutional factors, administrative traditions, and local preferences (Dollery et al., 2008b; Hulst 
et al., 2009; Wollmann, 2004), none of which have much to do with the purported ‘global trends’ 
invoked by the current debate.  
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To take a step forward in understanding public arrangements it is necessary to surpass the 
simplistic view that sees collaboration as inherently “good” or “bad” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, pp. 
561-562). Collaboration is certainly context-specific (Luna-Reyes, Gil-Garcia, & Cruz, 2007) and 
this is the fixed point from which we need to start the analysis. Institutional theory, with its 
emphasis on the context and on the acquisition or enhancement processes of legitimacy, is a useful 
means to address the complexity of public collaborations.   
The institutional perspective 
Institutional theory and research focus the reflection on the common traits shared by the 
organisations and the analysis of the sources and types of pressure to conform (Hatch, 2006, pp. 86-
87). The basic idea is that the institutions regulate and restrict the behaviour of political and social 
actors in that they define their values, roles and identity, and condition their actions and choices. 
The institutional perspective assigns a preeminent role to the environment as the main source of 
isomorphism and convergence processes of the organisational forms: ‘by incorporating institutional 
rules within their own structures, organisations become more homogeneous, more similar in 
structure, over time’ (Scott, 1998, pp. 212-213). Moreover, institutional-level decisions precede and 
constrain interactions and decisions at the policymaking level, which in turn constrain the 
operational level (Imperial, 2005, p. 298). 
The three general mechanisms conducive to isomorphism - coercive, mimetic, and 
normative - (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) guide and inform public partnerships formation. The 
coercive pressures arise when, for example, the supranational bodies (e.g., the European Union, 
EU) or higher levels of government use the top-down approach to impose the setting up of 
cooperative forms on local governments as a condition for receiving assistance (Pollitt, 2001), e.g., 
financial subsidies or technical support. The integration process has led the EU countries to enact 
directives related to the management of institutional relations between municipalities, provinces, 
regions and state. In Italy, these Europe-wide changes are teamed with important internal reforms, 
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including the new political party system, the direct election of the mayor, the lengthy and uncertain 
transition to federalism, and the stability pact that imposes strict limitations on the municipalities. 
Mimetic pressures arise when the actors seek to replicate whatever they see as successful, 
desirable or appropriate for their specific environment. The object of imitation could be the 
proposed or actual reforms of other jurisdictions (Dollery et al., 2008a, p. 195). Imitative processes 
can achieve tangible effects. For example, a greater external legitimacy of the organisation can 
enhance reputation, image, prestige or congruence with the prevailing norms. In turn, this may 
make the public organisation more competitive for public funds (Graddy & Chen, 2009, p. 56). 
In terms of normative pressures, the business schools and consultancy firms play a decisive 
role in inspiring the values and the choices of action of the public managers (Sorge & Van 
Witteloostuijn, 2004). The most important influence of NPM was the rationale it gave for adopting 
private-sector management principles and practices, along with market and quasi-market 
mechanisms for service provision as a means to improve municipal management systems (Dent & 
Barry, 2004; Dollery et al., 2008a, p. 194). This process of norm-formation (Pollitt, 2001, p. 938) 
affects the nature and scope of reforms (Dollery et al., 2008a). Getting together to ‘create a system’ 
means counting more on wherever the new powers, competences and resources of the local 
administrations are attributed. In that frame, public collaborations can aspire to play a key role as 
intermediaries between municipality and province, but also between municipality and region. 
The institutional isomorphism recognises thus the variety of the public’s strategic responses 
to environmental pressures. In fact, the academic work that theoretically and empirically addresses 
the theme of public collaborations (e.g., (Barretta & Busco, 2011; Barringer & Harrison, 2000; 
Grafton et al., 2011; Krishna, 2003) makes it clear that any or all of the above pressures are often 
inter-related and concurrent. But how can we read those situations in which an institutionalised 
collaborative practice is openly discarded or ‘left to its fate’ by its own promoters?  
Recent institutionalist research (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Lawrence, Suddaby, & 
Leca, 2009; Oliver, 1992) started to address the study of the effects of actors and agency on 
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institutions using Oliver’s (1992, p. 564) concept of deinstitutionalisation, i.e., 'the de-legitimation 
of an established organisational practice or procedure as a result of organisational challenges or the 
failure of organisations to reproduce previously legitimated or taken-for granted organisational 
actions'. Deinstitutionalisation is used herein to interpret the empirical evidence on the voluntary 
inter-municipal partnerships in the Lombardy region. 
Background 
Italy has exploited the potential of inter-municipal cooperation by harnessing a wide range of 
instruments with widely different levels of institutionalisation, such as consortia, conventions, 
agreements, and unions; a situation fairly unparalleled in other European countries. 
The Unioni di comuni (Unions of Municipalities or UM) - defined as a separate multi-
purpose governing entity set up specifically by two or more municipalities to which these latter can 
transfer a broad range of actions, from joint policymaking to joint implementation and delivery of 
services – were originally established as a temporary instrument of association for very small 
municipalities (less than 5,000 inhabitants) prior to their envisaged successive merger. The UM 
have been the object of significant legislative reforms in recent years. Initially, the UM were scarce 
because the law forced the municipalities in question to merge (Fiorillo & Robotti, 2006). That 
hurdle was removed in 1999 and by 2010 the total number of UM in Italy had grown to 313. A total 
of 1,561 Italian municipalities are members of a UM, while approximately 5.8 million citizens live 
in a municipality that belongs to a UM (Testa, 2010). As second-order organisations they have 
become the main form of inter-municipal cooperation in many regions. 
The UM is structured into boards that represent all or a subset of participant municipalities. 
The bylaws should stipulate that the UM chairperson be elected from the mayors of the partner 
municipalities and that the other bodies be composed of local council members and the boards of 
the associated municipalities to guarantee the representation of minority interests. The UM has full 
powers to establish its own organisation, carry out the functions transferred to it, and manage 
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financial relations with the member municipalities. The UM is the beneficiary of the income 
generated by the services it is called on to provide and the public contributions of which it is 
recipient. 
It is the responsibility of each region to regulate and support the inter-municipal 
collaborations. The rules establish the requirements to obtain the funding, the incentive criteria, and 
the amount of the additional resources to reward compliance (Formez-Anci, 2005). Generally, the 
regional rules seek to create beneficial conditions for the potential implementers, i.e., the higher the 
number of partners and the higher the number and significance of the services transferred to the 
UM, the higher the contribution awarded. For example, the Lombard UM are required to jointly 
manage at least three of the following functions and/or services: information systems; technical 
office; economic-financial management; tax management; urban planning and environmental 
management; staff payroll; local police; and social care services.  
Further, the regional systems distinguish between extraordinary and ordinary contributions, 
whereby the former are issued at the official setting up of the UM, or in the case of municipal 
mergers (as in Lombardy), while the ordinary contributions are allocated to support ordinary 
activities for a maximum period of 7-10 years. The rules assume that regular funding can help the 
UM to achieve economic self-sufficiency in the medium term (Formez-Anci, 2005, p. 22). Some 
regional administrations provide the UM with additional support through contributions for the 
development of feasibility studies.  
Currently, the UM is the only type of collaborative form supported by government funds. 
National norms (e.g., Decree 318/2000 of the Ministry of the Interior) call for additional resources 
to be issued to those municipalities that form or join a UM. The criteria to obtain that funding are 
similar to those of the regionally administered policies. The regional systems are based on a more 
structured funding application procedure and, in addition, ensure the UM a constant flow of 
resources over time. That predictability ‘lets participants plan and budget with confidence’ 
(Imperial, 2005, p. 309). On the other hand, the allocation of national funding to a UM is prone to 
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fluctuation because it depends on the government’s budget policies. The Italian UM are monitored 
both by the Ministry of the Interior and by the relevant regional administrations through a periodic 
reporting system.  
Methods and research setting 
This research adopts a qualitative approach. The empirical evidence gathered between 2009 and 
2010 in the Italian region of Lombardy during earlier fieldwork (Sorrentino & Simonetta, 2011, 
2012) has enabled the authors to explore: i) the different forms of inter-municipal collaboration: ii) 
the reasons for and the limits to cooperation; and iii) the perceived impacts of these initiatives. To 
qualitatively assess the capacity of incentive-based policies to push the councils in the direction 
desired by the legislator – i.e., service sharing and joint policymaking to promote the local 
communities – the data collected in the semi-structured interviews held with public administrators 
and UM managers were used along with documentary research. Lombardy offers a heterogeneous 
and fragmented picture of associative forms that are extremely sensitive to local area specificities 
and poorly guided by the regional administration. Surprisingly, a mere 147 of Lombardy’s more 
than 1,000 small municipalities in 2010 were members of permanent collaborative forms such as 
UM. Research has shed strong light on the counter-intuitive and, in some cases, paradoxical effects 
of incentive-based policies aimed at spurring collaboration, including: 
· Higher fragmentation of concrete associative practices. Lombardy has the highest number 
(60) of Unioni di comuni, the only associative forms that now qualify for state and regional 
contributions. In tandem, the Lombard councils (1,546) are involved in a mix of different 
collaboration initiatives (over 500) governed by different contractual forms depending on 
the theme/service. Generally, the simplest and most common form of cooperation are single-
purpose agreements between two neighbouring municipalities;  
· Limited power and capacity for joint action. 71% of Lombard UM has no more than three 
small municipalities, most of which, once established, make no progress and so stagnate; 
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· Low networking capacity between UM members. Only rarely does a UM bring new 
municipalities into its fold; in fact, it is far more frequent to find a reduction in the number 
of functions and services transferred to the UM by the participant members. The re-
internalisation of the services previously mandated to associated management can often be 
observed. 
Prior fieldwork has highlighted also the crucial role played by the mayors and the local 
councillors involved in the creation of collaborative arrangements, to such an extent that in some 
cases the fate of the UM is tied by a double thread to the political fortunes of their promoters. The 
task here is to verify whether the fragility observed in most of the Lombard UM cases can be traced 
to what Oliver (1992, p. 564) defines as ‘deinstitutionalising pressures’, using the empirical 
evidence gathered in the two earlier studies. Why does an established UM become an empty box or 
fall out of favour? To respond to this question, the next section will review the political, functional 
and social pressures for deinstitutionalisation that prior fieldwork on Lombard UM has pinpointed.  
Findings 
A number of issues emerged from the interviews with the public administrators, including the wide 
variety of service delivery strategies from which the respondents select actions and decisions based 
on their knowledge of the contingent situation. The empirical evidence of the pressures on 
deinstitutionalisation produced by the interviews and presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3, below, was 
generated in response to the questions concerning the operational roll-out of the collaboration 
initiatives implemented at local level. The illustrative quotes presented in the tables refer to the 
entire panel analysed, including the UM that have spurred progress and development. The data 
collected have been reclassified using the categories identified by Oliver (1992), i.e., political, 
functional and social pressures. 
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Political pressures 
In the small municipalities, the direct (i.e., non-mediated) relationship between the citizen and the 
public administrator is crucial and cannot be avoided. According to all the respondents, the UM 
suffer from what is called a “democratic deficit”. The smaller the municipality, the more direct the 
relationship between mayor and voter. This means a constant work of “re-stitching” is needed (the 
burden of which is mostly carried by the mayors of the partner municipalities) aimed at preventing 
the decisions of the UM from being perceived as far from satisfying the interests and directions 
expressed by the partner councils. When the interest in maintaining a UM fades, the UM is 
reconsidered. In this circumstance it is probable that additional resources are spent for inappropriate 
purposes (i.e., to fund the current management rather than investments). 
Table 1. Political pressures 
 
POLITICAL PRESSURES ILLUSTRATIVE QUOTES 
Legitimation of the administrators does not go 
through the UM  
The citizens vote for me not the UM (councillor) 
Transferring services to the UM reduces the ability 
of the elected official to personally resolve the 
problems of the citizens who appeal to him/her 
directly (UM general manager) 
The UM can become the victim of instrumental 
political attacks 
During the election campaign, one of the board 
members attacked the UM, accusing it of inertia. 
When he became a councillor, he continued to 
sabotage the initiatives until the municipality left the 
UM definitively (local official). 
Significant dispute between councils (due to 
political dissensus or conflicting interests) 
Two mayors started with the ambition of providing 
extra services and implementing a shared path of 
organisational innovation, but a third municipality 
was less convinced and, in fact, at the first sign of 
difficulty, decided to opt out (UM Secretary). 
In two cases councillors resigned after the services 
under their management were transferred (UM 
general manager) 
Exposure to political risks in situations where the 
UM has a high level of organisational integration 
We already do a lot … transferring other services to 
the UM would be a significant effort and I’m not 
sure it’s worth it (mayor of a lead municipality). 
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The mayors who made huge efforts in the setting-up 
phase did not feel up to facing the political risk 
inherent in accelerating the merger of their 
municipalities (UM secretary)  
UM seen as an end to obtain and distribute 
additional resources 
It was easier to convince the opposition parties [to 
approve the incorporation of the UM] than my own 
majority, but when I showed them the funding 
contributions, everyone agreed (mayor). 
 
Functional pressures 
Often, the partner municipalities themselves cast doubt on the real potential of the UM to enable 
economic savings and regain efficiency. Then, paradoxically, the freeing-up of resources (technical, 
financial, but especially staff) risks creating another problem for those municipalities with less 
organisational capacity, which then have to decide what to do with the extra staff: do they relocate 
them or redistribute tasks? The immediate costs of the reorganisation of services can eclipse the 
potential longer-term benefits.  
Table 2. Functional pressures 
 
FUNCTIONAL PRESSURES ILLUSTRATIVE QUOTES 
The return of investment may be unclear or 
intangible when a new UM becomes operational  
After the initial enthusiasm, we had to face a 
thousand obstacles ... Today the UM is mainly an 
economic, financial and administrative operations 
management centre, while the municipalities 
continue to provide the services with their old tools, 
based on their regulations and resources. (UM 
secretary) 
The convenience of remaining in the UM is 
evaluated in terms of the low or practically non-
existent exit cost 
… the municipalities that left our UM created 
another on their own (mayor) 
The freeing-up of resources deriving from the 
operating synergies can become a “hot potato”  
… I wouldn’t know how to relocate them (mayor) 
I would like to avoid internal conflicts with the staff 
of my municipality (councillor) 
Transferring a service that was previously managed 
in-house by the municipality is a delicate decision: 
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… the manager and the employees who run the 
service no longer deal with the political and 
technical bodies of the individual municipalities but 
with those of the UM (UM secretary). 
The amount of the funding received is deemed 
inadequate compared to the costs incurred 
Certainly I’d receive a modest financial 
contribution... It will be the job of the next mayor to 
do better” (mayor) 
The possibility of mutual gain (or ‘collaborative 
advantage’) is questioned 
Not all our members have been able to realise the 
benefits produced by the shared management of the 
services (UM Secretary)  
The operating standards present in the lead 
municipality are not sustainable by small partners 
like us (mayor) 
 
Social pressures 
Interviewees suggested that in periods of economic crisis the critical focus of the citizens shifts to 
the so-called “costs of politics”. On the other hand, the search for solutions that respond to 
situations of unease can lead the councillors to look for extempore points of exit, dictated by 
particular local conditions: the UM enables access to additional resources. In the citizen’s eyes, the 
UM is an “opaque” agency and can thus become an easy target for those who do not know it and 
thus distrust it. The value of collaboration via a UM is questioned by a low social consensus. 
Table 3. Social pressures 
 
SOCIAL PRESSURES ILLUSTRATIVE QUOTES 
Public criticism against the UM, considered a source 
of waste, a kind of “useless agency” 
The citizens tend to lump everything together, 
mainly because the associative forms that preceded 
the UM have not been disbanded (UM secretary) 
The economic crisis exacerbates the difficulties of 
the small municipalities to respond to social unease  
Before establishing a new UM, the mayors should 
look at what is already going on in associative form. 
These activities should be the first to flow into the 
UM. Instead, each municipality invents the “wheel”, 
also using the occasional services of the staff of 
other municipalities …  it’s madness (UM Secretary) 
The citizens have little faith in the capacity of the 
UM to resolve real problems  
The UM is invisible… Many of my fellow citizens 
ignore its existence or fail to grasp its usefulness 
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(UM councillor) 
Low rate of associative culture in the local 
community  
[after 4 partner municipalities left]...the UM 
actually gave up playing a bigger role in local 
politics, and especially supralocal politics (UM 
general manager) 
 
Discussion 
This paper suggests the usefulness of applying the theory of Oliver to the analysis of 
voluntary inter-municipal partnerships. The argument is that managing and developing joint work 
implies a fragile balance of competing forces and pressures. The setting up of permanent forms of 
local collaborations such as the UM is an opportunity for change that the diverse actors decide to 
take or not, based on personal opinions and preferences but also opportunities and constraints that 
can change along the way. The paper highlights the tension between a common objective (that of 
the UM), and the personal independent objectives pursued by the local actors. The strategies 
developed by each of these in response to the political, functional, and social pressures that exist in 
the different local areas shape the fate of the UM. The upshot is that, in a highly formalised body 
such as a UM, development and continuation over time cannot be taken for granted. 
The paper corroborates the view that the ‘economic rationalist’ preoccupation (Hood, 2000) 
does not seem decisive either for inducing the actors to work together at the outset or for ensuring 
the development of the joint initiatives over time.  
The broader picture of inter-municipal collaboration in Lombardy reveals that when it 
comes to the production and delivery of public services the municipalities have a specific 
preference for loose inter-organisational relationships rather than the more formal type. Not only do 
the former (bilateral agreements with other municipalities or outsourcing contracts with external 
providers) predominate in absolute terms, they are also the ones that continue to grow after joining 
a UM. In Scandinavia, the complete opposite is true: ‘It seems that the more formalised the 
collaboration is, the easier it is for local governments to use the tools of meta-governance and get 
the collaborating actors committed’ (Haveri, Nyholm, Roiseland, & Vabo, 2009). That indicates 
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further reasons for analysing the collaboration practice ‘in context’ (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 
2000, p. 24). 
Oliver’s concept of deinstitutionalisation enables the dissipation of many established UM to 
be traced to the following predictive antecedents:  
· Low number of staff transferred from the member municipalities to the UM; 
· Low rate of services devolution (particularly those that imply the sharing of back-office 
operations: e.g., construction, technical office, bookkeeping, financial statements); 
· Transfer to the UM of solely basic/less critical services; 
· Lack of unified structures (so-called Single Offices or Uffici Unici) under the UM; 
· Few significant developments in terms of number of services and number of partners after 
the UM is set up; 
· Use of regional funds to pay for the current services managed; 
· Set up of new less binding bilateral arrangements even after the UM is established; 
· Re-internalisation of services previously transferred to the UM; 
· Withdrawal of member municipalities from the UM; 
· Political discontinuity of one administration versus its predecessor; 
· Unaligned electoral calendars. 
All the abovementioned antecedents (except for the last two) stem from the precise choices 
of the UM leaders, which corroborates the ‘management matters argument’ (Boyne, Meier, O'Toole 
Jr, & Walker, 2006, p. 9; Ospina & Saz-Carranza, 2010), i.e., the crucial role of the collaborative 
public managers in favouring or blocking the collaboration effort (O'Leary & Bingham, 2009).  
We have yet to understand the heuristic value of Oliver’s conceptualisation in relation to the 
role of the incentive policies designed to respond to the problem of the marginality of the small 
municipalities, which offer extra resources to induce the desired behaviour (i.e., collaboration 
between local agencies through a UM to jointly provide efficient and efficacious services), but also 
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leave the councils significant room for discretion in terms of the collaboration environment and the 
degree of organisational integration of the shared activities and reporting requirements. In short, 
policies that are poorly selective in both inputs and outputs and that are only loosely guided by the 
regional administration translate into a weakly structured organised field of action. The Regione 
Lombardia has preferred to “keep its head down” by: 
· setting low selective eligibility requisites and not setting an exit cost in the case of 
municipalities that leave the UM. In both cases the UM’s value is reduced; 
· calling for limited actions to accompany the setting up of the UM. The municipalities 
potentially interested in entering collaboration projects but lacking the necessary 
organisational capacity do not even get off the ground; and 
· establishing an ex post monitoring/control system aimed at verifying procedural compliance 
but not the outcomes of the UM. The lack of careful oversight by a regional administration 
reduces the reporting activities to a mere bureaucratic requirement and leads the councils to 
adopt opportunistic behaviour. 
The good news is that, whichever way you look at it, the use among small councils of inter-
municipal associative forms has grown in recent years, therefore the modest results achieved so far 
can be seen as a “cup half full”. Paradoxically, however, the Regione Lombardia risks fuelling the 
delegitimation of the UM that it itself is funding. Each of the critical factors recalled above, in fact, 
can help, severally or jointly, to erode the UM practice.   
Conclusions and future research 
Having problematised popular understandings of public partnerships from the empirical viewpoint, 
this paper has underscored the need to use concepts other than NPM to analyse collaboration trends. 
The central argument is the usefulness of the institutional lens to read the creation and 
implementation processes of the voluntary inter-municipal arrangements, but also to help to clarify 
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the development or disruption of collaboration over time. Specifically, the paper sheds lights on the 
practices of deinstitutionalisation that the UM leaders adopt to respond to the political, functional 
and social pressures that characterise their respective local areas. According to Oliver (1992, p. 
567), the effect of these practices leads to the 'dissipation or rejection' of an institution.    
Developing a better understanding of the range of contrasting effects of collaboration 
contributes to the extant literature on publicly-funded partnerships. Adding to the knowledge may 
be particularly important for the managers of small and marginal municipalities. It is crucial for 
these actors to understand both the advantages and the disadvantages of inter-organisational 
relationships before they make a commitment to participate (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). In the 
case of the managers, it is equally important that these are able to promptly recognise  the predictive 
factors that can trigger disfavour or disuse of institutionalised organisational practices. 
A major limitation is the fact that this exploratory study is hard to use as a generalised 
example because it addresses only a small number of UM, ‘photographed’ at a certain point in time, 
and uses empirical data collected from one specific category of key informants, i.e., the UM leaders. 
In addition, the research approach adopted here does not enable the identification of which factor 
(or combination of factors) is decisive for the future of the UM analysed. Finally, the considerations 
made do not take account of the outcomes and the impacts of the collaborative efforts. 
These limitations suggest future avenues of research. Further effort is needed to update the 
picture of the Lombard UM as shaped by the legislation enacted by the Italian government at the 
end of 2011 (Law n. 214/2011), which tightens up the norms on associative forms. For example, the 
law now restricts the association of municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants to exclusively 
two organisational forms: bilateral agreements (or conventions) and UM. Moreover, it defines the 
basic functions that must be implemented by inter-municipal collaboration. A longitudinal research 
approach applied to the entire panorama of the Lombard UM (which have meantime shrunk in 
number) could shed light the effects of the new institutional framework on the discretional space of 
local actors. In addition, further enquiry using data gathered expressly to explore 
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deinstitutionalisation is needed to closely examine the antecedents of  UM disruption, to find out 
why and in what circumstances they jointly operate and interact, and with what results. In fact, we 
cannot rule out that the ‘political fallout of deinstitutionalisation’ (Oliver, 1992, p. 583) will 
necessarily lead to disruption. The disbanding of a UM could, for instance, be a precondition to 
pursuing a new institutional initiative, such as the merger of the municipalities in question. Finally, 
future research will need to address the conditions that facilitate the municipalities’ adoption of 
virtuous behaviours in order to develop a system of indicators that can help the regional policy 
setters to assess the efficacy of the collaborative efforts. To sum up then, a far broader and deeper 
effort is required on the empirical research front to capture the trends and critical factors of use to 
the national and regional policymakers working on the reconfiguration of local services through 
collaboration. 
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